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Scientists have traditionally limited the mechanisms of social cognition to one brain, but recent approaches
claim that interaction also realizes cognitive work. Experiments under constrained virtual settings revealed
that interaction dynamics implicitly guide social cognition. Here we show that embodied social interaction
can be constitutive of agency detection and of experiencing another’s presence. Pairs of participants moved
their ‘‘avatars’’ along an invisible virtual line and could make haptic contact with three identical objects,
two of which embodied the other’s motions, but only one, the other’s avatar, also embodied the other’s
contact sensor and thereby enabled responsive interaction. Co-regulated interactions were significantly
correlated with identifications of the other’s avatar and reports of the clearest awareness of the other’s
presence. These results challenge folk psychological notions about the boundaries of mind, but make sense
from evolutionary and developmental perspectives: an extendible mind can offload cognitive work into its
environment.
T
he past couple of decades in the cognitive sciences have brought about profound changes in our under-
standing of the mind. Once mainly characterized in purely abstract computational terms of rule-based
symbol manipulation, it is nowadays widely emphasized that our mind is embodied in a living organism1 as
well as extended into our concrete technological and social environment2. Perceptual experience is no longer seen
as resulting frompassive information processing, but as ‘‘enacted’’ via regulation of sensorimotor loops and active
exploration of the environment3–5. The continuous changes taking place in our conscious experience, neural firing
patterns, and sensorimotor interaction are beginning to be modelled and integrated in terms of dynamical
systems theory6–8. The study of social cognition in more embodied and interactive settings has also been gaining
in prominence9–11, and a corresponding rise in ‘‘second-person’’ neuroscience, which studies the brains of two
people in real-time interaction, has begun to reveal neural mechanisms that are specifically active during social
encounters12–14.
One of the major outstanding controversies in this area is whether dyadic interaction can sometimes play a
constitutive role for an individual’s social cognition, such that a part of social cognition is realized by social
interaction itself15. Although it is widely recognized that social interaction is essential for children’s development
as well as for facilitating adult social cognition, many cognitive scientists prefer to view the mechanisms of
cognition as being strictly limited to the brain of one individual16–18. This traditional individualist assumption
has been challenged from a variety of disciplines, which emphasize that embodied interaction with the world and
with other people can also do real cognitive work19. However, practical difficulties of studying complex human-
to-human interactions in real-time have hampered progress in resolving this debate20. While there are good
theoretical reasons for supporting an ‘‘extended’’ interpretation of social cognition21, and agent-basedmodels22 as
well as dynamical systems theory23 have demonstrated the possibility of interactively enabled mind extension in
principle, the theory of an extended-interactive social cognition is still lacking more solid experimental support.
One promising approach to coping with the complexities of human-to-human real-time interaction is to
mediate the interaction process via a human-computer interface that reduces the scope of social expression to
a more manageable level. This approach has the added advantage that it allows a full recording of the sensor-
imotor dynamics of the interaction, because the entire process unfolds in a virtual space. Several psychological
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studies using such highly constrained virtual environments have
thereby succeeded in showing that the interaction process itself can
sometimes spontaneously facilitate aspects of social cognition24.
Using a minimalistic virtual reality interface that allows only linear
movement in an invisible 1D space, and which provides on/off tactile
feedback about the presence/absence of object contact, Auvray,
Lenay and Stewart25 have devised an interactive approach to social
cognition research, which has come to be known as the ‘‘perceptual
crossing paradigm’’ (Fig. 1). The experimental setup was inspired by
classic psychological studies of children’s sensitivity to social contin-
gency, such as the ‘‘double video TV paradigm’’ pioneered by
Trevarthen and colleagues26–28. Auvray et al. asked participants to
locate the other active player’s avatar while avoiding two nonrespon-
sive distractor objects of equal size; one was static, the other object,
called the ‘‘mobile lure’’ or the other’s ‘‘shadow’’ object, exactly cop-
ied the partner’s movements at a fixed distance – like an instant-
aneous replay condition (Fig. 2). The three objects that each
participant could encounter were therefore only distinguishable by
their differing affordances for interaction. Since only two of the three
objects were mobile and only one of these was able to respond to
contact, each object could potentially be identified by its unique
affordances. For example, only a static object enables the possibility
of relocation at always exactly the same point without any surprises,
whereas only a moving object enables the possibility of spatiotem-
porally dispersed interactions such as chasing after it and losing track
of it, while only a responsive object affords the possibility of mutual
coordination of action, embodied communication, turn-taking, and
imitation of each other’smovement patterns. Participants were asked
to click whenever they judged that they were currently interacting
with the other’s avatar.
Auvray et al. found that participants were able to successfully
locate each other in the virtual space, withmost clicks being on target.
However, surprisingly, participants seemed unable to consciously
distinguish their partner’s avatar from the moving distractor object:
the probability of clicking after making contact with the partner was
not significantly different from the probability of clicking after mak-
ing contact with the other’s shadow. Instead, the correct social judg-
ments could be explained by the increased stability of mutual
interaction. Since both participants actively look for each other, they
tend to continue interacting when they happen to make mutual
contact, while tending to move away from overly stable (a static
object) and overly unstable (a non-responsive object) situations.
The solution to the task, i.e. a participant’s sensitivity to social con-
tingency, was thus interactively realized.
Auvray et al.’s results have been confirmed by related experi-
mental variations24,29,30, and further supported by agent-based mod-
els31–33. However, a more radical interpretation of this experiment,
namely that it has demonstrated that aspects of social cognition can
be constituted by social interaction15, has become the target of much
criticism34–36. One of the caveats is that this interactive self-organiza-
tion apparently leaves an individual’s conscious or explicit social
cognition about the other person, as measured by their clicks, un-
affected: a regularly or randomly timed automatic click would have
much the same objective outcome – since participants spend more
time interacting with each other, clicks would tend to happen more
often during their interaction. In other words, while the interactive
self-organization of mutual localization is a nice example of implicit
social scaffolding, this interactive process may have remained com-
pletely external to the minds of the participants and therefore falls
short of conclusively demonstrating an interactive constitution of
social cognition34–36.
Accordingly, Lenay and Stewart30 attempted to demonstrate that
participants are also able to appropriate this interaction process from
their first-person perspective. Arguing that participants need to be
able to form an explicit memory trace of their past interactions, they
introduced three different sound stimuli, one randomly assigned to
each object, which were triggered upon contact. They asked players
to identify the sound associated with the other’s avatar after the end
of a trial, rather than instructing participants to click whenever they
judged to be interacting with the other player. The experiment was a
success. For the first time the probabilities of object identification
indicated an explicit recognition of the other’s avatar, and it has been
suggested that such external feedback is necessary to identify the
source of stimulation24. However, this explicit appropriation of the
interaction process by the individuals is still not necessarily an inter-
active achievement as such.
Importantly, recognition of a previously encountered object is
enabled by the external sound signal alone, no matter whether the
current interaction dynamics resemble those of a previous encoun-
ter. Thus, reliable identification of the other’s avatar can simply be
achieved by noticingwhichmobile sound ismore frequently encoun-
tered. Although this experiment has demonstrated explicit social
cognition, the introduction of interaction-independent markers for
object discrimination hasmade it unclear whether this cognition is in
fact interactively constituted. The new experiment thereby leaves the
original critique unaddressed and the larger theoretical debate
unresolved37.
On our view, if a memory trace is in fact necessary for an experi-
ence of the other player’s presence, then this recognitionmust also be
interactively enabled by the two players without external aid, for
example by co-developing a communication system on the basis of
previous interactions. Only in this manner can it be guaranteed that
any reported experience of the other player will be constituted by
their interaction, rather than by some interaction-independent ele-
ment of the experimental setup.
We employed the perceptual crossing paradigm to assess the abil-
ity of 17 pairs of participants (N534) to recognize each other’s
presence only by engaging in interaction (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). We
hypothesized that previous studies using this paradigm had failed
to find evidence for the interactive constitution of explicit social
cognition, because they had neglected to set a collaborative task that
required players to actively co-regulate their interaction in the service
of communication or joint action38. We therefore specifically
instructed players to form a team and to help each other in finding
each other, and we ran the experiment as a tournament game to
further motivate pair-wise cooperation. A team gained a point for
every click that correctly identified the other’s avatar, while losing a
point for every wrong click. Only one click per player per trial was
Figure 1 | Experimental setup of perceptual crossing paradigm. The two
participants can only engage with each other via a human-computer
interface that reduces their scope for bodily interaction to a bareminimum
of translational movement and tactile sensation. Each player’s interface
consists of two parts: a trackball mouse that controls the displacement of
their virtual ‘‘avatar’’, and a hand-held haptic feedback device that vibrates
at constant frequency for as long as the avatar overlaps another virtual
object and remains off otherwise. Three small lights on each desk signal the
start, halftime (30 s), and completion of each 1-minute trial.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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allowed (additional clicks were discarded); absence of a click was not
penalized. Players were not informed about the successes of their
clicks during the experiment such that no externally supervised
(and therefore non-interactive) reinforcement learning was possible.
Experimenters were also blind to the outcomes; clicking accuracy
and team scores were only calculated after the completion of the
study. Each team was tested for 15 trials with randomized avatar
starting positions; each trial lasted one minute (see Fig. 3 for time
series of an exemplary trial).
Results
The tournament was a success with most teams achieving high click-
ing accuracy and high scores (Table 1). After combining the data
from all players, we find thatmedian clicking accuracy was 92%. This
is significantly better than chance level, and improves on the signifi-
cant results found by related studies25,29. Accuracy was not achieved
by a conservative strategy; a median of 10 clicks per player (out of a
possible total of 15) correctly identified the other’s avatar. We ana-
lysed the experiment from several perspectives.
Objective behaviour: significance of social judgments.The clicking
accuracy could still fall short of demonstrating that social interaction
constituted social cognition in this case, because in previous studies
participants’ high clicking accuracy was fully accounted for in terms
ofmore frequent contacts with the other’s avatar, rather than because
of explicit social judgments24. We therefore determined the overall
probability of a click following a single contact with a specific type of
object. This calculation was based on 382 clicks from a total of 386
clicks; 4 clicks had no identifiable target. Contacts involving mutual
sensory overlap were the most frequent type of encounter (28996
avatar contacts compared to 5046 shadow contacts and 5621 static
object contacts), but this did not fully explain the proportion of
correct clicks (338 avatar clicks compared to 33 shadow clicks and
11 static object clicks).
In contrast to previous studies, players’ clicks were specifically
sensitive to contact with the other’s avatar: a click was nearly twice
as likely to bemade after a player was stimulated by the other’s avatar
(1.17% probability) when compared to the other’s shadow object
(0.65% probability), and almost six times as likely when compared
Figure 2 | Virtual environment of perceptual crossing paradigm. Players are virtually embodied as avatars on an invisible line that wraps around after
600 units of space. Each avatar consists of a binary contact sensor and a body object. Unbeknownst to the players a ‘‘shadow’’ object is attached to each
avatar body at a fixed distance of 150 units. There are also two static objects, one for each player. All objects are 4 units long and can therefore
only be distinguished interactively in terms of their different affordances for engagement.
Figure 3 | Time series of an illustrative trial. Recording of the interaction between a pair of players across the 1D virtual environment (y-axis) over
the 60-second duration (x-axis) of their 13th trial. Solid dark blue and dark green lines represent the positions of the two avatars, while the dotted blue and
green lines represent the positions of their shadows. The solid light blue and light green lines represent the location of each player’s specific static object.
The arrows indicate the time of click for each player. From 5 s onwards a turn-taking (TT) interaction is noticeable (see theMethods section for a detailed
explanation of how TT is measured). The green player’s TT performance was nearly perfect because, during the 10 s before her click, there was a
well-coordinatedmutual exchange: first green stimulatedwhile blue remained passive and then the roles were reversed (TT level of 0.88). The blue player’s
TT level was also good but slightly lower. There was a well-coordinated exchange of turns duringmuch of the 10 s preceding her click, but this ended with
a mismatch during the final seconds: blue failed to stimulate continuously in response to green’s becoming passive (TT level of 0.52). Both players
reported that they had a clear awareness of the other at the time of their click (PAS ratings of 4).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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to contact with a static object (0.20% probability). Judgments about
the other’s presence were thus specifically related to making contact
with each other. These results confirm a predictionmade on the basis
of an agent-based model of the perceptual crossing paradigm,
namely that turning the individual epistemic task of agency detection
into a social pragmatic task aimed at mutual coordination would
implicitly facilitate discrimination of the other’s avatar39.
Further analysis of clicking behaviour reveals that interactions
between participants were highly coordinated in at least two
respects. First, the success of clicks was highly co-dependent within
trials: players were nearly twice as likely to jointly click correctly
than for only one of them to click correctly alone. There were 131
trials of ‘‘Joint Success,’’ during which both players clicked correctly,
compared with 76 trials of ‘‘Single Success,’’ during which only one
player clicked successful and the other player clicked wrongly or not
at all; there were 48 wrong clicks. Second, the timing of clicks in
Joint Success trials was highly co-dependent even though partici-
pants could not directly sense the occurrence of each other’s clicks.
Clicks tended to occur close in time and the highest proportion
happened in less than two seconds of each other. The near syn-
chrony of recognition is due to the social interaction between the
players; it cannot be explained in terms of independent entrainment
to a shared time signal such as the duration of the trial (Fig. 4). This
indicates that social judgments were not so much based on an
individual recognition of the other but rather on a mutually shared
recognition of each other, i.e. on an interactively shared cognitive
process.
Subjective ratings: Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). In order to
determine if participants also consciously experienced their
interactive success we recorded their subjective reports. Free-text
descriptions occasionally gave the impression that there were
shared experiences of each other’s presence (Table 2), but this
effect was difficult to quantify. To better assess the subjective
effects of mutual interaction we measured the felt clarity of the
other’s presence with an adapted Perceptual Awareness Scale
(PAS)40, which is a reliable direct measure of consciousness41. After
each trial in which they clicked, players were asked to give a PAS
rating between 1–4: ‘‘Please select a category to describe how clearly
you experienced your partner at the time you clicked: 1) No
experience, 2) Vague impression, 3) Almost clear experience, 4)
Clear experience.’’
We emphasize that whereas a click reflects a social judgment about
an objective state of affairs with respect to the other’s current spatial
position, a PAS rating is a categorical representation of the subjective
experience of the other’s presence. In agreement with phenomeno-
logical approaches to intersubjectivity, the adapted PAS can be inter-
preted as a direct measure of empathy, understood as the experience
of a thematic encounter with a concrete other42. However, since
researchers of social cognition typically use the notion of empathy
in a more restricted sense, in particular to refer to the experience of
sharing emotions43, in the following we will describe PAS ratings in
terms of awareness of the other’s presence in order to avoid
confusion.
We analysed a total of 384 PAS ratings from a total of 386 clicks
(two ratings were absent). In general, players most frequently
reported a clear awareness of the other’s presence (PAS 4), which
fits with the high levels of clicking success. PAS levels 4, 3, 2 and 1
were reported 143, 121, 101 and 19 times, respectively. More specif-
ically, the clearest awareness of the other was most often reported for
clicks occurring in Joint Success trials (Fig. 5). In order to determine
whether there is a significant difference between the average PAS
ratings reported for clicks occurring in Joint Success, Single
Success and Wrong Click trials we applied a one-tailed, two-sample
equal variance t-test. The equality of variances was verified using an
f-test for each comparison. The average PAS rating was significantly
higher for Joint Success clicks than for Single Success clicks (mean-
joint53.11 PAS, meansingle52.75 PAS, one-tailed Student’s t-test,
P50.001), and nearly significantly higher than for wrong clicks
(meanwrong52.89 PAS, one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.072).
Although itmight be expected that the other player’s presence should
be experienced significantly more clearly for clicks occurring in
Single Success trials when compared to wrong clicks, this was not
the case (one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.180); both conditions were
most frequently associated with medium levels of awareness.
Experience of the other’s presence was therefore not directly based
on the other’s objective presence, i.e. on the correctness of a click per
se, but rather on the reciprocity of the interaction process with the
other, as indicated specifically by Joint Success trials. A similar trend
is observed in terms of Confidence Ratings.
Table 1 | Results of the tournament game sorted by team score. The team score was calculated by summing both players’ correct clicks
(‘‘Avatar clicks’’) and subtracting both players’ wrong clicks (all other clicks). The maximum achievable score was 30 (i.e. correct clicks by
both players for all 15 trials). For each player the number of clicks per object type is shown, as well as those without any identifiable target
object (‘‘None’’)
Player 1: Player 2:
Team
score Avatar clicks Shadow clicks Static clicks
None
clicks
Clicking
accuracy Avatar clicks Shadow clicks Static clicks None clicks
Clicking
accuracy
27 12 0 0 0 100% 15 0 0 0 100%
26 13 0 0 0 100% 13 0 0 0 100%
24 12 1 0 0 92% 13 0 0 0 100%
23 12 0 0 0 100% 11 0 0 0 100%
22 13 0 0 0 100% 9 0 0 0 100%
22 10 0 0 0 100% 12 0 0 0 100%
19 9 1 0 0 90% 11 0 0 0 100%
19 14 0 0 0 100% 8 2 1 0 73%
19 11 1 0 0 92% 10 1 0 0 91%
18 8 0 0 0 100% 12 1 1 0 86%
18 11 0 0 0 100% 10 3 0 0 77%
16 11 1 0 0 92% 8 1 1 0 80%
12 10 2 0 1 77% 6 0 0 1 86%
10 9 0 1 0 90% 6 1 2 1 60%
10 9 1 1 0 82% 3 0 0 0 100%
6 9 2 1 0 75% 6 3 2 1 50%
21 5 7 1 0 38% 7 5 0 0 58%
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Subjective ratings: Confidence Ratings (CR). We followed the
suggestion by Auvray and Rohde24 to measure Confidence Ratings
(CR), which is a reliable indirect measure of conscious experience44.
Post-trial questionnaires asked players to report a CR rating between
1–4 if they had clicked during the trial: ‘‘Please select a category to
describe your confidence in your click’s accuracy after the end of the
trial: 1) No confidence, 2) Low confidence, 3)Medium confidence, 4)
High confidence.’’
During the instructions at the start of the experiment it was
strongly emphasized that whereas the PAS asks about the partici-
pant’s experience at the time of the click, the CR scale asks about their
confidence in the accuracy of the click after having completed the
trial. The difference was highlighted to measure whether experience
and confidence dissociated. For example, it is possible that a player
clicked because of having felt a clear social experience at the time, but
then later revised their confidence about the veridicality of this
experience on the basis of subsequent interaction. The first three
teams did not complete the CR questionnaire, so the results are only
representative of the 14 subsequent teams.
We analysed a total of 305 CR ratings from a total of 321 clicks (16
ratings were absent). The distribution of CR ratings is qualitatively
similar to that of PAS ratings: the highest level of confidence (CR 4) is
most frequently reported overall, but especially for clicks in trials of
Joint Success (Fig. 6). Medium levels of confidence (CR 3) were most
frequently reported for correct clicks that were not matched by a
partner’s success (Single Success) and for wrong clicks. In other
words, high confidence was not based on the objective co-location
of the other player as such, but rather on mutual participation in the
interaction (i.e. on Joint Success, but not Single Success, trials).
However, there is also a slight dissociation between the two rating
scales. In contrast to the PAS, there is a notable increase in frequency
of the lowest CR category, i.e. absence of confidence (CR 1), from
Joint Success to Single Success to Wrong Click trials.
Taken together these trends in CR ratings indicate that, by the end
of a trial, players had a more accurate insight into the kind of situ-
ation in which they had been involved when they had clicked. Some
players were able to realize on the basis of subsequent interaction that
they had likely clicked in the absence of the other player’s participa-
tion, as shown by the lower levels of confidence following Single
Success and Wrong Click trials. This suggests an interaction-based
possibility of learning, which could be a topic of future investigation.
Objective ratings: turn-taking. To objectively measure the amount
of active co-regulation taking place during an interaction, we
evaluated the extent of turn-taking (TT) that occurred before each
click. Our measure yields a player’s TT level as a number within the
range [0–1], with 1 representing a perfect coordination of turns (an
illustrative trial is shown in Fig. 3).We calculated howmuch the pairs
of players traded periods of active stimulation and passive reception
during 10 seconds preceding a player’s click (see Methods for
details). The results show that the level of TT performance was
positively correlated with cooperation.
The comparison of average TT performance preceding clicks that
occurred in Joint Success, Single Success and Wrong Click trials was
done using the one tailed t-test. Since an f-test revealed unequal
variances between TT levels in Joint Success and Wrong Click
conditions, we used a two-sample unequal variance t-test for those
comparisons. An f-test revealed equal variances for TT levels in Joint
Success and Single Success, as well as Single Success andWrong Click
conditions, so a two-sample equal variance t-test was used to com-
pare them. TT was significantly higher before clicks in Joint Success
trials compared to Single Success trials (meanjoint50.23 TT,
meansingle50.14 TT, one-tailed Student’s t-test, P52.631024), and
compared to wrong clicks (meanwrong50.11 TT, one-tailed Welch’s
t-test, P53.331027). Even though it might be expected that TT
performance was significantly higher before correct clicks in Single
Success trials when compared to wrong clicks, this was not the case
(one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.15). As with the subjective ratings,
TT is therefore not an indication of objective clicking success per se,
but rather of cooperative interaction.
TT performance was also positively correlated with a clearer
awareness of the other’s presence. The statistical comparison of
Figure 4 | Jointly successful players synchronized with each other. Clicks in Joint Success trials tended to happen close in time, even though players
could not directly sense the occurrence of the other’s click. The histogram shows the frequency of trials (y-axis) given a range of temporal delays between
clicks (x-axis). The pairwise comparison represents the distribution of delays between two clicks within each Joint Success trial. The most frequent delay
was for clicks to occur in less than two seconds of each other (20 trials). The random comparison represents the distribution of delays between randomly
paired clicks across the set of Joint Success trials (we calculated the delays between all jointly successful clicks and normalized the results). Short delays
(,10 s) tend to occur more frequently in the case of pairwise comparison than random comparison, which means that synchronization of players is an
interactive achievement. It cannot be explained by their independent entrainment to an external factor (e.g. absolute trial time in seconds), since
such a factor would be unaffected by the randomization of comparisons across trials.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Table 2 | Example of trial-per-trial free-text subjective reports. Participants were asked to very briefly describe their experience of the other’s
presence after each trial. The following example illustrates a typical development across the 15 trials from the players’ perspectives. In the first
few trials the other’s presence is obscured, but soon players start to become aware of the other’s presence by noticing themselves to be the
object of the other’s searching movements. After a few more trials a turn-taking (TT) interaction starts to take shape, alongside a clearer
presence of the other. This allows for some communicative intentions to be felt and shared. Some uncertainties arise while the conventions of
mutual interaction are negotiated and modified over later trials, but co-presence tends to be re-established reliably. All clicks correctly
identified the other player’s avatar (PA).
Trial Player Describe the sensation of your partner’s presence: Click PAS TT
1 1 I wasn’t sure if it was actually the partner’s avatar or just a moving object. PA 2 0
2 She moved as if she is not just random, she seemed to know it’s me. PA 4 0
2 1 by the avatar’s ‘‘exploratory’’ movement, / / /
2 / / /
3 1 I think I ‘‘found’’ the partner’s avatar quite close to the static object? So I wasn’t sure if
it was actually the avatar or the static object.
PA 2 0.25
2 vaguely PA 2 0.08
4 1 I tried to compare the difference in sensation by looking for the static object and the
partner’s avatar. The difference was very clear.
PA 4 0.48
2 Ah, it’s she! PA 4 0.43
5 1 the partner’s avatar was again moving around my avatar PA 4 0.22
2 / / /
6 1 even when I stopped moving, I would receive a irregular feedback PA 3 0.17
2 Clear experience! It’s she! She is alive! PA 4 0
7 1 I wasn’t sure if it was a moving object or the partner’s avatar. PA 3 0.20
2 Ah, I come to understand now to recognize her! PA 4 0.24
8 1 I wasn’t sure if I got the partner’s avatar. / / /
2 / / /
9 1 I think there was a turn-taking-like communication. PA 4 0.52
2 She likes me! PA 4 0.31
10 1 It looks like we’ve established a way to communicate. PA 4 0.40
2 I came to wonder if it is only an object. How can I feel it. / / /
11 1 clear! PA 4 0.20
2 Only objects cannot locate as this. PA 4 0.14
12 1 presence of an intelligent object PA 4 0.40
2 Clear, but afterward she escaped from me, which makes me wonder if that was
really her, but only an object.
PA 4 0.32
13 1 wasn’t sure if it was the partner’s avatar PA 2 0.03
2 Sorry I forgot clicking. / / /
14 1 It felt clearly that we were trying to tell each other that we found ourselves. PA 4 0.30
2 I guess it may be her, but she tends to escape (this was not clear to me) from me. PA 3 0.40
15 1 Felt like she found me. PA 4 0
2 It’s she! / / /
Figure 5 | Relative frequency of Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) ratings. The subcategory ‘‘Joint Success’’ includes ratings reported for clicks in trials
during which both players clicked correctly; ‘‘Single Success’’ includes ratings reported for correct clicks in trials during which the other player clicked
wrongly or not at all; ‘‘Wrong Click’’ includes ratings reported for wrong clicks regardless of the other’s clicking success. The clearest experience of the
other player’s presence (PAS 4) was most frequently reported for clicks in Joint Success trials. This clarity subjectively distinguished cooperative
situations; other clicks were most frequently associated with a medium level of social awareness (PAS 3).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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average TT performance associated with each PAS level followed the
same procedure. An f-test determined the variances to be equal, so a
one-tailed, two-sample equal variance t-test was applied in each case.
Average TT is significantly higher for PAS 4 compared to PAS 3
(meanPAS 450.23 TT, meanPAS 350.18 TT, one-tailed Student’s t-
test, P50.007), and especially compared to PAS 2 (meanPAS
250.15 TT, one-tailed Student’s t-test, P53.431025). There was
no significant difference between PAS 4 and PAS 1 (meanPAS
150.19 TT, one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.16), but this may have
resulted from an insufficiently representative sample of PAS 1 ratings
(see next subsection for further discussion). These analyses confirm
related findings showing that TT tends to be spontaneously
co-developed in situations that require a sensitivity to social contin-
gency, for example to create a novel embodied communication pro-
tocol45 and for assessing each other’s real-time responsiveness46.
Effects of a potential outlier. We included all the data in our
statistical analyses above, even though a potential outlier may
partly explain the fact that (a) the PAS average for clicks occurring
in Joint Success trials was not quite significantly higher than the PAS
average for wrong clicks, and (b) the fact that the average TT level
preceding clicks associated with PAS 4 reports was not significantly
higher than the average TT level before clicks with PAS 1 reports. In
particular, there was one highly skilled player who clicked 11 times,
100% correctly, out of which nine clicks occurred in Joint Success
trials, and with a reasonable average TT performance of 0.3, but who
consistently reported having had no experience of the other’s
presence for all clicks (PAS 1). When excluding that player from
the statistics we end up with the expected trends: (a) the new PAS
average for clicks occurring in Joint Success trials is significantly
higher than the PAS average for wrong clicks (meanjoint53.2 PAS,
one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.017), and (b) the average TT
performance preceding PAS 4 reports is significantly higher than
the new average TT performance before PAS 1 reports (meanPAS
150.05 TT, one-tailed Student’s t-test, P50.001).
If we take this player’s unusual PAS reports at face value, then it
seems possible to be involved in a sufficiently reciprocal interaction
to jointly achieve the task, yet without any conscious experience of
the other’s presence at all. This is compatible with a second-person
approach to social cognition which hypothesizes that, in addition to
interactional reciprocity, awareness of other minds also significantly
depends upon emotional engagement12, a factor which was not mea-
sured in the current experiment. The player may thus have employed
a detached, non-engaged style of interaction. Future perceptual
crossing experiments should include ameasure of players’ emotional
engagement to determine whether this is in fact an essential factor in
experiencing others. At the same time the discrepancy is in accord-
ance with warnings from other studies of conscious experience,
which have found a dissociation between subjective ratings and
objective measures47. Our results confirm the methodological worry
that direct measures of subjective experience cannot simply be
replaced by objective measures of related behaviour48.
Discussion
Our hypothesis was that the perceptual crossing paradigm could be
used to demonstrate that social interaction can in some cases con-
stitute social cognition, without relying on elements that are inde-
pendent from the interaction process itself. Following the enactive
approach to perception, which holds that perceptual experience is
constituted by active sensorimotor coordination3,4, Froese and Di
Paolo38 proposed that participants in the original perceptual crossing
study should be capable of a clear experience of the other, but only
when they manage to mutually coordinate their sensorimotor inter-
actions, for example in joint action. More precisely, ‘‘the task should
be changed such that an intended activity of one participant can only
become realized by the coordinated activity of the other’’38,23–24. As an
illustrative example we can think of the gesture of giving, which can
only succeed if it is complemented by the gesture of receiving. The
conditions of satisfaction of this kind of action go beyond individual
agency49. We therefore replicated the original experimental setup,
but with one crucial modification in the instructions: we told parti-
cipants that they were engaged in a cooperative game and asked them
to help each other in their task of identifying each other.
We made two predictions. We hypothesized on the basis of an
agent-based model of the perceptual crossing paradigm39 that those
participants who managed to spontaneously develop a way of mutu-
ally coordinating their behaviour would exhibit more accurate click-
ing performance. And on the basis of the theoretical considerations
of the enactive approach to perception and sociality38, we hypothe-
sized that those same participants would also clearly experience
Figure 6 | Relative frequency of Confidence Ratings (CR). The subcategory ‘‘Joint Success’’ includes CR ratings reported for clicks in trials during which
both players clicked correctly; ‘‘Single Success’’ includes ratings reported for correct clicks in trials during which the other player was unsuccessful
(i.e. they clicked wrongly or not at all); ‘‘Wrong Click’’ includes ratings reported for wrong clicks (regardless of the other’s success). The highest
confidence in the accuracy of a click (CR 4) wasmost frequently reported after Joint Success trials. This confidence subjectively distinguished cooperative
situations; other clicks were most frequently associated with a medium level of confidence (CR 3).
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themselves as being engaged in social interaction, and thus dem-
onstrate first-person awareness of the other’s presence, specifically
during that kind of mutual interaction.
Both of these hypotheses were confirmed. Most participants of
the current study were able to interactively coordinate their
embodied interactions in the minimal virtual space so as to create
sufficient conditions for jointly becoming aware of each other’s
presence, and thus to click with higher accuracy. The fact that
such co-regulation gave rise not only to a correct social judgment
but also to an experience of the other’s presence supports the
enactive approach to social cognition. It gives empirical support
to the theory that social interaction can sometimes partially con-
stitute social cognition15, especially when that interaction is co-
regulated by participants38. It also backs the proposal that experi-
encing others is a perceptual modality constituted by exercising
one’s social skill of interacting with others50. As predicted by the
enactive concept of ‘‘participatory sense-making’’51, we specifically
found that mutual participation is constitutive of making sense of
the social. These results challenge our folk psychological notions
about the boundaries of mind52, but make sense from evolutionary
and developmental perspectives because an extendible mind can
partially offload the mechanisms of cognition into its environment
and thereby augment its capacities23.
Going beyond cognitive extension, the results also have impli-
cations for the science of consciousness. The fact that a significant
number of players simultaneously became aware of each other
during their mutual dynamical entanglement is in accordance
with the theory that the mechanisms of consciousness are also
embodied in our comportment within the (social) world53, and
not just limited within our brain54. Whereas cognitive scientists
have traditionally assumed that we are fundamentally isolated
within our own heads, we suggest that we are actually open to
genuinely sharing our minds with the other people around us – as
long as we mutually participate in the unfolding of our embodied
interaction.
Methods
Subjects. Participants were healthy volunteers recruited from acquaintances at the
University of Tokyo (N534). There were 25 Japanese nationals, the rest were from
various countries. Six were female. Themean age was 29 years. Teams were randomly
created as volunteers became available. The Ethical Committee of the University of
Tokyo approved the study. All of the participants gave their written informed consent
before taking part in the study.
Experimental setup. At the start of an experiment participants were seated at two
tables that were separated by a temporary wall (Fig. 1). On their desk they found a
custom-made human-computer interface, active noise-cancelling headphones, a pen,
and stapled papers consisting of the informed consent form, a detailed description of
the experiment, and questionnaires. The interface consisted of three elements: 1) a
commercially available trackball mouse, whose left- and rightward rotation changed
the position of the player’s avatar; 2) a small hand-held vibrationmotor, which would
indicate any overlap between that avatar and another object by vibrating at constant
speed, otherwise it would remain off; and 3) a series of 3 LEDs, which signalled the
beginning of a trial (top light on), the middle of a trial after 30 seconds (middle light
on), and the end of a trial (bottom light on). A change in light was also accompanied
by a beep in the headphones to ensure that players were aware of the timing even
when not looking at the LEDs.
Task instructions and training procedures. At the start of the experiment we
followed Auvray et al.25 in explaining the whole setup of the study and answering
any questions participants may have, but without revealing the fact that the
moving distractor object was actually rigidly fixed to the other’s avatar at a
distance. We explained that the moving object behaved similar to a player, but
that it was merely following a pre-recorded trajectory and was therefore not
responsive to contact. In contrast to other studies based on the perceptual crossing
paradigm, we repeatedly emphasized that this was a cooperative game and that
players formed a team. They were encouraged to work together to solve the task,
but without specifying how they were to accomplish this cooperation in practice.
Players were asked to devise a name for their team, which would later be used to
anonymously rank their team score against the other teams participating in this
tournament.
Again following Auvray et al., the players then familiarized themselves with the
experimental equipment during a training phase, which involved interacting first
with a static object, then with a slowly moving object and finally with a faster moving
object, both moving at constant velocity. No interaction between the players was
possible during this phase. Each of these objects was presented for the duration of a
trial (1 minute) so that players could get a sense for howmuch time they had per trial.
For the training with the static object players were encouraged to first locate the object
and then to move away from it until they would encounter it once more. They were
informed that this gave them a sense of the length of the 1D environment before it
wrapped around. For the training with themoving objects players were asked to track
the moving object as it moved around the circle as best as they could. Directly after
training the proper experiment began.
Testing procedures. Players were asked to turn on the active noise cancellation of
their headphones, and then to put them on; brown noise was played continuously.
The experimenter started a trial as soon as both players held their human-computer
interface in their hand. After each trial players were given a couple of minutes to
complete the post-trial questionnaires and free text. After the end of the 15 trials they
were given as much time as needed to provide additional free-text comments about
their experience and general feedback about the experiment. Finally, players were
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment, and the nature of the avatar-shadow
link was revealed. The results of the tournament were e-mailed to each participant
after the completion of all experiments.
Analysis: identifying the target of a click. Several choices had to be made with
respect to the calculation of the intended targets of clicking behaviour, because it
is often necessary to disambiguate situations in which a player is interacting with
the other player’s avatar or their shadow object in close proximity to the static
object (there exists no spatial ambiguity between avatar and shadow because they
are always set to be 150 units apart). We therefore chose a combined
spatiotemporal measure: If the other’s avatar (or shadow) is within range of a
player’s avatar one second before her click, assign the other’s avatar (or shadow)
as the intended target. The range [270, 170] was chosen so that the other’s avatar
and shadow cannot be within range at the same time. If neither the other’s avatar
nor their shadow were within range one second before her click, but the static
object was within range, then we assigned the static object as the target. Otherwise,
nothing was the intended target. This procedure assigned a cause to most clicks;
only 4 out of 386 clicks had no discernable target.
Analysis: identifying the source of a contact. Several choices also had to be made
about how to calculate the total number of contacts between an avatar and the three
types of object, especially when there was overlap between two object types.We chose
to define a player’s ‘‘contact’’ as a string of uninterrupted tactile activations, with each
object type contributing to this sequence being counted only once, even if involved in
the same sequence at multiple distinct times. This choice reflects the player’s first-
person perspective on the situation. As an illustrative example we can consider the
following fictitious time series (with ‘‘1’’ representing overlap between a player’s
avatar and another object, and ‘‘0’’ no overlap):
111000111100111000 (player’s tactile stimuli)
-----------------------------------------------
100000111000000000 (other’s avatar)
011000101100000000 (static object)
000000000000111000 (other’s shadow)
The first tactile contact (three consecutive stimuli) consists of an overlap with
the avatar lasting one time step, and another overlap with the static object lasting
two time steps. The next tactile contact (four consecutive stimuli) consists of an
overlap with the avatar lasting three time steps, and an overlap with the static
object at two distinct moments lasting one time step and two time steps,
respectively. The final contact (three tactile stimuli) consists of an uninterrupted
overlap with the shadow object. Accordingly, both the avatar and the static object
were involved in the first two tactile contacts, while only the shadow object was
involved in the third contact, giving the following total number of contacts:
avatar52, static52, and shadow51.
Analysis: identifying an exchange of turns. Several decisions also had to be made
regarding the calculation of a player’s turn-taking (TT) performance. We wanted a
measure that would exclude situations in which both players were continuously
moving (or not moving) at the same time, or in which only one of the two players was
continuously moving while the other was continuously stationary. At each time step
we classified each player’s behaviour in binary terms as either moving (1) or non-
moving (0) by evaluating their computer mouse movement (we will refer to these
behaviour time series as B1 and B2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively). Movement
was considered to have taken place whenever the change of position dx from one time
step to the next was bigger than an 8th of the avatar’s body size (i.e. 4/850.5 so that if
dx.0.5, 1, else 0). Since players often engaged in micro-saccades during their ‘‘turn’’
we chose to set a lower limit to the duration of pauses so as not to end up with micro-
turns. Thus, we only set behaviours to 0 if there was no motion over at least 50
consecutive time steps (500 ms), otherwise they remain set to 1.
In order to determine a difference in activity, we applied the logical ‘‘Not-And’’
operator to these two time series (i.e. D5 B1Not-And B2). Then, we assigned to each
player their active contribution of this movement exchange by applying the logical
‘‘And’’ operator and summing the result (i.e. C1 5 sum(B1 And D); C2 5 sum(B2
And D)). The overall TT performance for a given time period was then calculated by
multiplying the players’ active contributions and normalizing the outcome such that
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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TT5 4 *C1 *C2/T2, whereT is the number of time steps. The range of TT is therefore
0–1, with 0 representing a complete absence of TT interactions and 1 representing a
perfect exchange of activity and passivity between the players. A trial with one of the
highest TT levels is shown in Fig. 3. Data was recorded every 10 ms (100 Hz).
See Supplementary Information for further discussion of the experimental setup.
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